Irrational Actors and the Process of Brutalisation:Understanding Atrocity in the Sierra Leonean Conflict (1991-2002) by Mitton, Kieran
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1080/13698249.2012.654691
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Mitton, K. (2012). Irrational Actors and the Process of Brutalisation: Understanding Atrocity in the Sierra
Leonean Conflict (1991-2002). Civil Wars, 14(1), 104-122. [1]. 10.1080/13698249.2012.654691
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 18. Feb. 2017
Draft Version 
1 
 
Irrational Actors and The Process of Brutalisation: Understanding Atrocity In The Sierra 
Leonean Conflict (1991-2002) 
 
Kieran Mitton  
 
Department of War Studies, King’s College London 
The Strand, London 
WC2R 2LS  
United Kingdom 
 
 
Email: kieran.mitton@kcl.ac.uk 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Draft Version 
2 
Irrational Actors and The Process of Brutalisation: 
Understanding Atrocity In The Sierra Leonean Conflict (1991-2002) 
 
 
KIERAN MITTON 
 
In the 1990s, vivid accounts of atrocities committed by Sierra Leone’s drug-fuelled 
child soldiers contributed to the portrayal of so-called ‘resource wars’ as some violent 
descent into a primordial anarchy. The academic rebuttal which inevitably followed 
stressed, by contrast, the very ordered nature of civil conflict, placing the rational-actor 
at the centre of supposedly ‘irrational’ violence. This paper nevertheless finds the 
rational-actor argument inadequate for explaining the most seemingly senseless acts of 
atrocity and calls for greater focus on expressive and psychological micro-foundations 
of violence in the study of civil wars. 
 
 
The perpetration of atrocities in conflicts, especially in an African context, has received particular 
focus within international media coverage which has struggled to understand the causes of these 
seemingly 'bizarre' and indiscriminate acts.  Perhaps due to this high profile, such violence has also 
been the site for competing explanations of conflict as a whole, some of which have seen the 
brutality and scale of these acts as indicative of an inherently 'anarchic' and violence-prone society.  
This flawed analysis has frequently advocated a cordon-sanitaire policy of action, which rather 
than addressing the root causes of conflict and its associated violence has risked allowing them to 
take an even deeper hold.  An accurate examination of atrocities and extreme violence is therefore 
crucial to an understanding of the wider conflict dynamics which frame them, and by extension, any 
policy prescriptions which may follow.   
 
This paper focuses on the civil war which took place in Sierra Leone between 1991 and 2002.  The 
principal reason for focussing on Sierra Leonean is that this conflict involved widespread and 
highly publicised atrocities, and as such became the central case study upon which many arguments 
concerning the motives for such violence were based. This is not to say that the violence witnessed 
in Sierra Leone was unique to this conflict, nor to the wider African continent. Indeed, precedents 
for these forms of horrific violence are found throughout history and across cultures. An early 
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instance of mass amputations in Africa, for example, came under the brutal reign of King Leopold 
II in nineteenth century Belgian Congo. In Columbia, during the period known as La Violencia 
between 1948-58, an horrific array of brutal mutilations similar to those of Sierra Leone were 
witnessed, including the often cited cutting open of pregnant women with machetes. Another 
marked characteristic of Sierra Leone’s violence - the use of child soldiers – has precedents as far 
back as ancient Sparta and fourteenth century Ottoman Empire. In the twentieth century, conflicts in  
Kampuchea and Mozambique saw children forcibly conscripted into the heart of violence, whilst as 
the war began to unfold in Sierra Leone in the 1990s, acts of atrocity against unarmed civilians were 
being perpetrated in the Balkans following the break up of Yugoslavia. These examples caution 
against demeaning descriptions of culturally specific savagery and African ‘hearts of darkness’; 
notions which have permeated much of the analysis of the violence of the Sierra Leone civil war to 
the detriment of our understanding.     
 
In dealing with ‘atrocity’, it is important to note the legal and moral values often associated with 
this concept. The term has a legal quality in its use in public prosecutions of war criminals; an 
atrocity is deemed to be an act that contravenes codes of conduct in war or society more generally. 
In popular usage in media accounts, atrocity carries with it condemnation of the act referred to. The 
atrociousness of these acts is often deemed to be their particular cruelty.1 Cruelty itself may be a 
subjective term, affected by certain biases with regards to notions of sophisticated killing versus 
unsophisticated killing, impersonal versus personal violence, and as Paul Richard’s has noted, 
‘cheap’ versus ‘expensive’ violence.2 Nevertheless, whether an act is labelled an atrocity appears 
strongly dependent upon intent, and it would seem, intent to inflict suffering upon victims. The 
notion of ‘extreme’ violence also suggests there can be proportionate or acceptable degrees of 
violence within conflict; atrocities are those acts which exceed these levels and are hence noted for 
their exceptional ‘brutality’ and ‘barbarity.’ What is acceptable and proportionate violence is 
strongly connected to the identity of the victim,  perceived innocence or otherwise of victims. The 
term ‘civilian’ brings with it an assumption of innocence to outsiders which is clearly often not 
shared by those perpetrating violence. Furthermore, the distinction between civilian and combatant 
can itself be very problematic. In the Sierra Leone civil war, the blurring of lines between soldiers 
and rebels resulted in the widely used term ‘sobel’; the line between combatants and civilians was 
equally ambiguous at times. Civilians were often viewed by combatants as collaborators, 
sympathisers, and in many instances, had indeed been previously involved in violence or would 
                                                 
1 See Kalyvas The Logic of Violence in Civil War pp53-54 
2 Richards Fighting for the Rainforest pxx. 
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later become active combatants. Whilst the victim of atrocity is most commonly associated with the 
innocent civilian, there are instances in conflict where combatants are also victim to atrocity. In 
Sierra Leone, direct confrontations between armed factions were rare and often intentionally 
avoided, yet on occasions where combatants of opposing factions were captured, torture, rape, 
mutilation and many other acts of extreme violence were frequently committed against them. 
The term 'atrocity' is used here to refer to acts of extreme violence which constitute the deliberate 
infliction of cruel physical harm on groups or individuals. Cruelty itself may be a subjective term, 
but is understood here as the deliberate infliction of pain and suffering as an end. The term 
‘atrocity’ does not indicate the irrationality of such action or otherwise, nor does it reflect its scale 
or the identity of victims involved.  However, the focus in this paper will lie upon acts of violence 
committed against civilians, since the impression of the victim as 'innocent' has often served to 
reinforce the perception of such violence as being especially 'barbaric'.1  
 
 
First, the evolution of the debate surrounding the Sierra Leonean conflict is discussed, highlighting 
the contest between neo-Malthusian arguments and rational choice theory.  Throughout the 
literature on this subject there is a fundamental failure to capture the true nature of many atrocities. 
The neo-Malthusian thesis, typified by Robert Kaplan's approach, is overly reductive in seeing the 
whole conflict as an inevitable and inherent chaos, whereas rational choice arguments, such as those 
made by Paul Richards, David Keen and Paul Collier, add too much strategic deliberation to 
violence which was often far from rational.  
 
Hence the second section moves on to consider the amended position of David Keen, who in 
answer to the problems and criticisms of his 'functional' approach, looks beyond the rational actor 
framework.  Discussion of the merits of his application of shame-related psychological explanations 
for some of the particularly brutal instances of violence highlight that the introduction of 
psychological analysis and the focus on emotional violence represent a much needed step in the 
right direction. Nevertheless, Keen's treatment displays the same reluctance as previous literature to 
recognise seemingly irrational forms of violence which cannot be understood either as strategically 
informed or as motivated through a fear of shame. Although Keen does discuss the notion of 
'shamelessness' and the role of a 'shame-free zone', it is argued that this strand of Keen's approach is 
far more significant than is made clear. 
 
Accordingly in the third section focus is given to the particularly brutal forms of violence which do 
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not readily fall into either a rational actor framework or Keen's shame approach, showing how the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) established and perpetuated a brutalising process whereby 
children were divorced from civilian society and its moral codes, thus becoming inured to violence. 
In this context attention is given predominantly to rebel atrocities, although it is clear that young 
combatants were employed by all sides and that abuses were not solely limited to the RUF, 
particularly given the blurred division between 'sides' and the frequent collusion of combatants. 
Nevertheless, as we shall see, it was the RUF who specifically instituted this process, with the result 
that young combatants were responsible for truly brutal atrocities which were in no sense motivated 
by rational strategy or shame, but were essentially the result of systematic brutalisation.  Avoiding 
the reductive conclusions of New Barbarism, the agency of older combatants and leaders in 
manipulating this 'mindless' violence for their own rational ends will be examined.2 This recognises 
how rational actors have actively manipulated irrational violence within the conflict. The 
implications of this understanding extend not only to the possible success of long term stability in 
Sierra Leone, but also to the wider stability of the West African region. 
 
 
Approaches to Violence: From Anarchy to Order 
 
With the onset of violence in the Balkans, United Nations involvement in the Gulf conflict, and 
civil wars breaking out across the African continent, many analysts sought to describe violence in 
the early 1990s as symptomatic of a ‘new’ kind of conflict which would increasingly hold 
prominence in the post-Cold War environment.3  A number of what Stathis Kalyvas has referred to 
as ‘bestselling lay-journalists’ promoted a neo-Malthusian school of thought, labelled ‘New 
Barbarism’ by it’s detractors, which used graphic accounts of violence in Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
the Balkans to argue that such conflicts could not be understood as conventional battles between 
armed forces for political or ideological supremacy, but as chaotic and inevitable eruptions of 
criminal violence caused by the release of ecological pressures and ancient hatreds.4 This violence, 
it was argued, had a ‘new and terrifying slant’; these were now ‘wars about nothing at all’, because as 
Hans Magnus Enzensberger argued, ‘violence has been freed from ideology.’5 In his influential 1994 
article ‘The Coming Anarchy’, journalist Robert Kaplan saw Sierra Leone as the archetype of a 
country suffering social breakdown under the stresses of a ‘surging’ population competing for 
scarce resources.6 The notion that Sierra Leone was reverting to a primitive state of lawless banditry 
was fed by nightmarish media reports of ‘savage’ atrocities and ‘mindless’ slaughter, perpetrated by 
diamond-seeking drug-addled child soldiers wielding machetes and machine guns.  
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If New Barbarism worked well in describing the horrific nature of atrocities, it was in reality a 
deeply inadequate explanation of their cause and their context in the wider processes of conflict. 
Indeed in many respects, New Barbarism had substituted an explanation for anarchic violence with 
a mere description of anarchic violence. The neo-Malthusian theories, and those which generally 
cited the conflict in Sierra Leone as evidencing a new kind of war, naturally therefore provoked a 
series of strong rebuttals in the academic community. In 1996 British anthropologist Paul Richards 
published Fighting For the Rainforest with the expressed purpose of countering New Barbarism. 
Richards emphasised the rationality of conflict, rather than its apparently anarchic nature, pointing 
to the role of long-term socio-political neglect fostered by a declining patrimonial system of 
governance in causing grievances among the rural population, particularly youth. Extreme violence, 
under this understanding, could be seen as a rational response stemming from this socio-political 
discontent. Richards therefore argued that behind the ‘savage series of incidents lay, in fact, a set of 
simple strategic calculations’; for example, amputations were used as a terror tactic to deter voting 
in elections considered politically unfavourable to the RUF.7 Beyond the strategic use of violence, 
atrocities could also be understood as part of a ‘dramaturgical’ expression of deep seated anger and 
grievance.8 This dramaturgy included, according to Richards, the exaction of particularly brutal 
violence as part of combatant’s determination to assert their own existence and significance on 
Sierra Leonean society, and indeed the wider world.9 Far from being anarchic, Richards saw 
atrocities as being ‘devilishly well-calculated.’10  
 
A second incarnation of Rational Actor analysis came in a large body of literature which examined 
the political economy of war. Proponents such as Mark Duffield, William Reno, and David Keen 
stressed the importance of conflict as an alternative system to inequitable peacetime society, both 
economically, socially and politically, emphasising that far from representing a breakdown or a 
collapse, conflict involved the establishment or refinement of processes which were to the benefit of 
certain actors.11  Violence in Sierra Leone, in this understanding, not only served political purposes, 
but served the individual machinations of those seeking to gain access to economic resources, 
achieve greater social standing or simply to gratify psychological and emotional needs such as a 
desire for a sense of physical security or adventure.  The functions of brutal violence, therefore, 
were key to understanding why and how atrocities occurred. Related to this approach, though in 
many respects having more in common with New Barbarism, was a movement by economists such 
as Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler that focused upon ‘greed’ motives in the Sierra Leone conflict, 
increasingly referred to as a ‘resource war’ linked to ‘blood diamonds.’12 Using econometric 
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analysis, Collier in particular argued that the conflict became for many an end in itself, with 
violence being the tool by which the profitable criminal enterprise of war was executed and 
sustained.  For Collier, political grievances and other functions of violence were largely secondary, 
if indeed present at all, to the overall driving force of material greed inherent in the warring parties. 
Atrocities under this understanding were therefore either part of economic strategy intended to 
facilitate trade and resource extraction, or were merely symptomatic of the irrelevance of popular 
support to apolitical criminal gangs. Considerable academic debate emerged pitting greed versus 
grievance explanations of conflict, which many commentators noted represented a false dichotomy 
between economic and socio-political incentives for violence. Nevertheless, whether viewing 
conflict as grievance inspired, greed inspired or a broad collective of interrelated political, social 
and economic factors, the rational-actor approaches commonly explained violent atrocities as 
functional calculations of rational strategy. 
 
The Rational Actor approach to understanding Sierra Leone’s conflict, though invaluable in 
countering the anarchy argument of New Barbarism, was nevertheless flawed in its overemphasis 
on the functionality of violence. For some, Richards’ focus on political grievances as motives for 
brutal violence risked giving undue justification for atrocities, whilst for others the very idea of 
'rational violence' betrayed conceptual incoherence and a failure to appreciate the truly barbaric 
nature of much of the conflict's violence.13 Economic greed also offered little explanation for acts of 
atrocity which gained no material benefit for the perpetrators and appeared to stem more from 
violent behavioural proclivities than rational strategic calculations. In the following examples, 
political grievances or economic greed are poor explanations for brutal violence: 
 
They send the children into the fire – two or three years old, girls and boys. They see belly 
woman [a pregnant woman] who have baby. They want say is it boy child, or is it a girl child? 
They cut open. They make everybody for clap and laugh. I don't know why they do that for.14 
 
My commander captured a girl with her [baby] sister and her mother. He shot the mother and 
the little baby dead. He left the adolescent girl alive but told her to remove her dress and he 
raped her . . . we all had to watch.15 
 
The failure of Rational Actor approaches to adequately explain these forms of violence reflects an 
overall reluctance to engage with instances of atrocity which in a very real sense appeared chaotic 
and irrational. Although witnesses and victims might be regarded as overly reductive in viewing 
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such violence as the result of ‘wickedness’ or crazed minds, these acts are equally misrepresented as 
the outworking of political strategy, economic agendas or functionalism. This problem is reflected 
in Thandika Mkandawire's criticism of Keen's use of the phrase ‘a particularly rational kind of 
madness’, which he condemns as an ‘oxymoronic...misuse’ of ‘the idea of irrationality.’16 To 
describe especially barbaric, politically self-defeating and often impulsive atrocities as betraying a 
'rational' madness is to ignore the wealth of evidence to the contrary; that these acts were by their 
very nature the result of a lack of strategy and political calculation. To truly counteract the New 
Barbarism thesis it is therefore necessary to move beyond the Rational Actor rubric, placing Sierra 
Leone’s atrocities within the very comprehensible and often ordered system of the conflict but 
without distorting their often chaotic nature.  
 
Beyond the Rational Actor Framework: The Shame and Shamelessness Argument 
 
In August 2002, David Keen wrote: 
  
The anger and fear manifest in the extreme violence in Sierra Leone could not easily be 
incorporated and explained within a 'rational violence' framework that conceptualises 
individuals as calmly deciding between alternatives on the basis of their self-interest.17 
 
In Keen's previous treatment of the conflict there had in fact been an implicit acknowledgement of 
the role of emotional violence in his discussion of the various psychological functions that war 
performed for combatants, including an analysis of the role of the ‘sensation of power’ and the 
‘reversal of relationships of dominance and humiliation.’18 In this respect Keen asserts that 
‘irrationality’, or ‘violence for its own sake’, always had a ‘back-window’ through which it could 
enter.19 Nevertheless, the Rational Actor framework has invariably focused on political and 
economic dynamics driving conflict in Sierra Leone, reflecting its greater focus on strategy and 
calculation as opposed to the less articulated factors of emotion and psychology.20 Seeking to 
redress the balance, therefore, Keen fully elaborates his amended position in his 2005 book Conflict 
and Collusion In Sierra Leone, building upon ideas sketched out in 2002. Of key importance is his 
introduction of the ideas of psychiatrist James Gilligan who, in researching the behaviour of US 
prisoners, sees a deeply ingrained fear of humiliation and shame within violent actors as the prime 
origin of their often self-defeating and self-destructive behaviour.21 With an acute sensitivity to 
shame fostered by past experiences of humiliation, Gilligan argues that violent actors seek to 
physically eliminate the perceived source of the threat of shame, often focusing on associated body 
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parts such as  ‘eyes that look’ and ‘tongues that laugh.’22  Keen applies this psychological theory of 
violence to Sierra Leone by highlighting conditions present in both peacetime and conflict that 
nurtured feelings and fear of humiliation and shame in violent actors. This argument, referred to 
here as the ‘Shame and Shamelessness’ approach, is based on two main elements: violence 
facilitated by a shameless environment, and violence arising from the threat of shame.23  
 
The shameless environment Keen identifies comes in the form of the rebel world, which established 
a ‘perverse universe’ in which moral codes were reversed and combatants acted with complete 
impunity.24 Through a system of reward and punishment, Keen argues, ‘a child learns what is good 
and bad behaviour.’25 In the cut-off rebel world, young recruits were rewarded for demonstrating 
brutality, punished for any reluctance to commit violence, and as a result learned violence as a 
virtue. Further facilitating this brutalising process were drugs, given to combatants to provide 
courage for the performance of brutal violence and to sooth consciences in the aftermath.26 Drugs 
also provided an avenue of escape from shame by shifting individual responsibility and moral 
agency to their maddening effect. The 'madness' and chaos of war itself also provided an external 
force to which combatants could off-load the responsibility for their brutal behaviour.27 
  
Interacting with the enclosed world of Shamelessness in Keen's framework is the ‘ever-present 
threat of shame.’28 Keen argues that the shame associated with committing atrocities against 
civilians could be avoided or reduced through a dehumanization of victims.29 Once the lives of 
civilians were devalued, the perpetuation of further physical abuses became inevitable. In this way, 
violence in itself became ‘a brutalising process.’30 The fear of being shamed by civilians, Keen 
argues, also encouraged combatants to attempt to physically suppress any perceived source of 
condemnation or rejection. Following Gilligan's argument, this included the targeting of body parts 
associated with shaming for mutilation. The threat of shame could also be felt by combatants in 
displays of sympathy by civilians for victims of atrocities, or in signs of weakness such as crying.31  
These negative civilian reactions to violence, Keen argues, were often taken by fighters as a 
judgement on their actions and ‘humanhood’, feeding rebel’s anger over being described as ‘wicked 
animals’ and ‘devils’.32  Finally, the threat of shame was also a useful tool for RUF commanders in 
seeking to deter desertion. By forcing recruits to attack and abuse members of their own family and 
community, Keen argues that commanders instilled fear in fighters that returning to their homes 
would expose them to shame for their actions and even retribution.33  In this respect atrocities 
became an essential strategic component of the RUF's continued existence.  
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As a response to the limitations of the Rational Actor conceptualisation of violence, the Shame and 
Shamelessness argument makes significant progress. The focus on the creation and perpetuation of 
conditions which served to remove the shame and stigma from atrocities highlights the crucial role 
that emotions and psychological motives played in the Sierra Leone conflict. Keen's examination of 
the removal of shame brings much needed attention to the manner in which grievances over Sierra 
Leone's peacetime conditions fermented real anger and frustration, which was not exclusively 
channelled into rationally derived political strategies aimed at social transformation. By showing 
how emotions interacted with a conflict environment in which legal and moral imperatives were 
removed or reversed, Keen's thesis underlines the need to consider the war as a whole as a violence-
facilitating process.34  The recognition of the active creation of Shamelessness, particularly in the 
instance of the use of drugs by young combatants, shows how violence was often irrational or 
mindless, and yet purposefully encouraged and manipulated by commanders. This manipulation is 
also apparent in Keen's analysis of shame as a deterrent, with forced atrocities betraying 
commanders’ rational strategy intended to reinforce combatants' membership and loyalty to the 
RUF.  In the Shame strand of Keen's argument, the employment of Gilligan's ideas proves 
particularly instructive in regards to seemingly mindless atrocities which included bizarre 
humiliations of victims or forced clapping and laughter.  In the example of the cutting open of a 
pregnant woman's womb to discover the sex of her unborn child, the witness states: ‘They make 
everybody for clap and laugh. I don't know why they do that for.’35  Using the insights of Shame 
and Shamelessness, however, this behaviour becomes less bizarre and inexplicable, more clearly 
understood as an attempt by combatants to coerce assent from civilians, betraying their sensitivity 
to condemnation and their demand for respect. In one of many examples of amputation, a fifteen 
year old victim describes how RUF soldiers targeted hands:  
 
They dragged us, they had us get down on our knees and put our arms on a concrete slab. They 
had others standing over us and holding us from behind. One rebel did all the cutting. A few 
had both hands cut off; others just one. And then they walked away. I couldn't even bury my 
arm. And now I don't think I'll ever find someone to marry me.36     
 
In this instance, Richards' explanation of amputation as a strategy related to voting is made 
redundant by the victim's age. Instead, the logic of shame proves more significant; the permanently 
visible mutilation was seen as reducing the victim's chances of marriage, reflecting the social 
stigmatization felt by many amputees and the degree to which such violence was seen as a 
humiliation.  In another example of shame-related violence, the testimony of a young teenager 
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highlights an attempt to reverse hierarchies through humiliation and to simultaneously coerce 
approval from witnesses: 
 
We decided to go to our grandfather's place, a chief. When we got there, the rebels came. My 
grandfather was killed by the rebels in front of the house. They put him in front of the house. 
They gathered his wives, and they shot him. They asked the wives to laugh.37 
 
In interpreting such atrocities, previous analysis has invariably ignored the importance of the role of 
shame and humiliation in motivating the brutality of violence. For New Barbarism, this violence 
simply reflected the primordial depravity of human natures that had not been ‘tranquillized’ by an 
‘educational and cultural standard’ derived from ‘Western Enlightenment.’38 Whilst Richards 
recognised a link between atrocities and grievances, this violence is misrepresented as ‘well 
calculated’ in the context of an overall strategy of political reversal.  Keen’s Shame and 
Shamelessness analysis makes sense, however, of particularly cruel violence that went beyond the 
requirements of rational strategies and appeared more strongly related to the emotional and 
psychological sensitivities of perpetrators. Rather than crudely dismissing this non-strategic 
violence as simply mindless, Keen shows just how important minds were in some of Sierra Leone's 
most brutal atrocities. 
 
In attempting to move beyond a Rational Actor framework, Keen's Shame and Shamelessness thesis 
is an important step in the right direction. The examination of the mechanics of shame brings much 
needed light to the emotional motivations for some of the most extreme acts of violence, yet it 
cannot in itself explain all atrocities in the conflict which seemed, superficially at least, devoid of 
motive or rational explanation. In part these forms of violence are discussed in the Shamelessness 
element of Keen's thesis, which in covering the role of drugs and the brutalising rebel environment, 
accounts for many indiscriminate acts of violence which appear to be born out of the absence of  
moral restraint and a certain mindlessness. However, reflecting the trend of previous approaches 
that sought to dismantle the flawed New Barbarism thesis, Keen is reluctant to attribute the 
Shamelessness factor with as much significance as he does that of Shame, reserving most attention 
for what is essentially a rationalization of emotional violence through recourse to Gilligan's ideas. 
Whilst it is clear that shame was an important factor in many instances of violence, by placing the 
greater stress on shame as a trigger for violence, Keen risks betraying the truly irrational nature of 
some of the worst atrocities in the Sierra Leonean conflict, adding an element of psychology which 
in many cases was not there.  
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The initial invasion of Sierra Leone and the atrocities that followed point to the limitations of 
Shame as an explanation for RUF brutality. When the RUF and their Liberian allies entered Sierra 
Leone in March 1991, they were not greeted by a hostile or critical civilian population, but rather 
one which if not openly in sympathy with rebel aims, was certainly open to listening to their 
grievances.  A teenager from the town of Pujehun describes how villagers gathered voluntarily ‘to 
lend an ear to the rebel's plea for democracy.’ During this meeting the village was ‘looted behind 
their backs as the high ideals were being espoused.’39  Throughout this early period, as Keen notes, 
‘no civilian was safe’ as rebels were ‘burning houses indiscriminately, looting and killing.’40 To 
describe these acts as evidencing a desire for respect and recognition, or as an attempt to ‘silence 
and invert’ condemnation, would be to ignore the fact that Sierra Leoneans had not greeted the 
invasion with condemnation and shaming behaviour. Indeed, condemnation followed, rather than 
preceded, the perpetration of atrocities.   
 
A further difficulty in applying the Shame argument comes when the role of child combatants is 
considered. If, as Keen argues, acts of atrocity were often committed through a fear a humiliation 
that stemmed from perpetrator's own experiences of humiliation within Sierra Leonean society, the 
limited experience of young recruits is problematic. Approximately 40,000 combatants in the Sierra 
Leonean conflict were children, many of whom were forcibly coerced into the conflict at a very 
young age when it would be nonsensical to talk of them holding grievances against a society they 
had hardly known.41 Indeed, if these combatants were to harbour any grievances they would most 
likely be directed toward those rebels who abducted them from their villages and families. If the 
youngest child soldiers had been brought up within the enclosed world of the RUF, exposed from 
an early age to its perverse moral universe that ‘profoundly messed’ with their ‘sense of what was 
right and wrong’, it is somewhat contradictory to posit shame as their motive for violence.42 Keen 
states that ‘our most immoral actions may stem precisely from our moral impulses, since without 
these we would have no sense of shame in the first place.’43 In the case of child soldiers, these 
‘moral impulses’ had been moulded by the 'shame-free zone' to accept violence and atrocities rather 
than to condemn them.  Therefore, to describe young combatant's atrocities as resulting from the 
threat of shame is to attribute to them a certain moral order which in truth they had never 
experienced.  If shame was not the driving motive of this violence, this certainly did not lead to less 
‘immoral actions’ or lower degrees of brutality among child-soldiers. Indeed, precisely the opposite 
appears to have been the case:  
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We feared them. They were cruel and hard hearted; even more than the adults. They don't 
know...what is good and bad. If you beg an older one you may convince him to spare you, but 
the younger ones, they don't know what is sympathy, what is mercy. Those who have been 
rebels for so long have never learned it.44 
 
This testimony suggests that far from a sense of shame arising from ‘moral impulses’, the 
particularly cruel brutality of this violence arose from a veritable absence of morality, at least in a 
form recognised by civil society, which in itself was a characteristic associated with young 
combatants fostered in the conflict environment.  In this sense, for many people victim or witness to 
such violence, the perpetrator's actions were in a very real way both ‘wicked’ and ‘irrational.’45   
It is the Shamelessness strand of Keen's argument then, which discusses the establishment of a 
brutalising isolated rebel world and its impact on child soldiers, which proves most useful in 
explaining much of the violence in which children were directly involved. A better understanding of 
the process of brutalisation in the Sierra Leone civil war offers an insight into the interaction of the 
chaotic violence of desensitised combatants with the rational aims of conflict leaders. This provides 
the most convincing refutation of New Barbarism's reductive conclusions without misrepresenting 
atrocities as inherently rational.  
 
‘A Particularly Organised Kind Of Chaos’46: Irrational Violence and The Brutalising Process 
 
There were clearly many various processes perpetuating conflict in Sierra Leone, and a whole 
spectrum of motives behind particularly violent atrocities against civilians. There is little doubt that 
grievances over long term abuses and disparities under the APC system of patrimony fostered anger 
and frustration which fuelled both  political violence and the more complex form of psychological, 
shame-related violence to which Keen has given valuable light.  It is also the case that economic 
agendas were an important factor, with many attacks against civilians facilitating looting and the 
capture of alluvial diamond mining sites. Nevertheless, there are many instances of particularly 
violent atrocity which do not readily fit within the rational framework of understanding violence in 
which individual actors conduct their behaviour based upon a calculation of the possible benefits or  
functional value. Whilst an understanding of the role of shame provides an important insight into 
some of this irrational violence, it fails to explain atrocities facilitated by the enclosed rebel world, 
which was in a very real sense beyond shame and the moral norms of civil society.  For this reason 
the ‘shame-free zone’ which David Keen discusses needs to be given much greater emphasis, and in 
particular, the manner in which children were manipulated within the conflict environment.  This 
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approach gives due recognition to the impression of many witnesses that atrocities were 'mindless' 
and even 'wicked', since it demonstrates how far from being motivated by grievance or strategic 
considerations, many young perpetrators acted violently according to a brutalising standard of 
behaviour which they had come to know as routine. 
  
The removal of combatants from Sierra Leonean society, and by extension the moral codes and 
conventions of behaviour which are established through community and familial life, was actively 
pursued through the large scale abduction of children. Although the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), and 
Kamajors recruited under age combatants to their ranks, it was the RUF who resorted to kidnapping 
young victims to forcibly convert them into rebel soldiers.47 According to Abdullah and Rashid, this 
reflected the ability of the army and civil militias to recruit volunteers seeking revenge against the 
RUF, whereas the RUF as perpetrator of many of these atrocities, found itself unable to rely on a 
broad constituency of support. With a shortage of ready volunteers the RUF began abducting 
children as the war progressed, seeking to ensure a long term supply of labour and military force, 
with young children providing easy targets and highly malleable recruits. The scale of these 
abductions, and therefore the number of young combatants affected by the isolated rebel 
environment, was considerable, with the NGO PRIDE confirming that 72% of ex-RUF combatants 
interviewed claimed to have been forcibly recruited.48 UNICEF put the number of children missing 
through abduction after June 1997 at 1,500, with 46% being between fifteen to seventeen years old, 
and 8% children under the age of eleven.49 The NGO Human Rights Watch documented numerous 
testimonies from those witness or victim to abductions, with many accounts confirming the very 
young age of those taken and their immediate introduction to training and combat: 
 
They [the rebels] gathered the abductees together and had them march up and down in the bush; 
left, right, left, right and so on and then divided them up into groups. They had the small boys 
from six to ten years old, then those from twelve to fifteen and finally those from fifteen to 
eighteen. For the older boys, the training was compulsory for all of them. I saw them doing 
physical exercises, teaching them how to dismantle and clean all kinds of guns, explaining them 
how many cartridges are in a clip, and all that.50   
 
Removed from their villages and towns, with only commanders and older combatants as figures of 
law and authority, abductees were inducted into the isolated world of rebel bush camps and exposed 
to a radically different moral order. While conditions were brutal and children suffered the worst 
abuses within the rebel habitat, so surgical was their removal from Sierra Leonean society and their 
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own families that children grew to see their captors as their kin, referring to the RUF leader Foday 
Sankoh as 'pappay.' Children’s membership within the rebel world was reinforced through the 
forced committing of atrocities, with RUF commanders giving direct orders to new recruits to maim 
and kill civilians, often members of their own families and community. This was not simply a test 
of loyalty or ritual of initiation, but was the beginning of a process of desensitisation to extreme 
violence. This violence for the sake of facilitating violence also had the crucial effect of 
emphatically sealing young combatants membership to the RUF's enclosed world, with atrocities 
against family members and communities ensuring children feared returning to civil society and 
possible reprisals, whilst also giving them common traumatic experiences which only their fellow 
rebel fighters could understand. The totality of their separation from civil society was epitomised in 
the words of a combatant during an attack on a mosque: “you bastard civilians; you don't like us 
and we don't like you.”51  
 
The process of brutalisation also involved the establishment an alternative rebel system of social 
and moral order which, as Keen argues, represented the reverse of that found in wider society. It 
was not simply that brutalisation was achieved through forced commands and orders, but that the 
entire hierarchy and social mechanics of the rebel world were geared towards the promotion and 
acceptance of violence as both routine and commendable. RUF commanders publically punished 
those reluctant to commit atrocities, with peer pressure reinforcing the stigma of exhibiting such 
‘deviance.’52 Likewise, displays of mercy towards civilians exposed combatants to the risk of being 
attacked themselves, whilst acts of particular brutality or inventive cruelty were greeted with 
rewards and even heroic status.  Young children were especially susceptible to these peer pressures 
and the dynamics of shame and status. As Ibrahim Abdullah has noted, older combatants were more 
likely to retain a sense of morality inherited from their life within Sierra Leonean society, and as 
such would need ‘longer periods to break in.’ With their greater autonomy of judgement they  might 
even ‘question superiors, disobey orders or desert.’53   Young children, however, nurtured within 
the confines of the rebel world from a young age, offered ‘blind obedience’ to the principles of their 
commanders, rendering them far more likely to commit atrocities without recourse to grievances or 
other rational justifications for violence.54  
 
If the brutalising environment of conflict meant young combatants developed a proclivity to 
violence, more behavioural than related to rational motive, then the use of drugs and other 
substances further contributed to the impression that their atrocities were mindless and irrational. 
Whilst it is clearly important to avoid invoking drug use as an excuse for combatants' behaviour, 
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particularly through what Baumeister describes as the ‘modern version of possession by demons’, 
the powerful effect that drug use had on young fighters and the scale of its practise should not be 
discounted.55 Furthermore, examining the role of drugs in facilitating violence recognises the 
agency of those in positions of authority who actively promoted their use in anticipation of their 
destructive effects. A Human Rights Watch report of 1999 describes ‘widespread usage’ of drugs 
such as cocaine, stating that ‘Most victims and witnesses [...] believe most of the atrocities were 
committed while under the influence of these substances.’56 Drugs were regularly administered by 
commanders to young combatants before they embarked upon atrocities, but also formed part of the 
daily divorcing process from civilian society, disorienting fresh recruits and making them more 
amenable to training and indoctrination:  
 
From the first day they drugged us. They showed me some powder and said it was cocaine and 
was called brown-brown. I saw them put it in the food and after eating I felt dizzy. I felt crazy.57 
One day I saw a group of rebels bring out about twenty boys all abductees between fifteen and 
twenty years old. They had them lined up under gunpoint and one by one called them forward to 
be injected in their arms with a needle. The boys begged them not to use needles but the rebels 
said it would give them power.  
About twenty minutes later the boys started screaming like they were crazy and some of them 
even passed out. Two of the rebels instructed the boys to scream, I want kill, I want kill and 
gave a few of them kerosene to take with them on one of their burn house raids.58 
Another abductee described the effects of being injected with a psychotropic substance, stating “I 
was flying and my head ached [...] my head felt heavy and confused.”59  The way in which drugs 
filled young combatants with a sense of power and fearlessness also had a significant impact on 
their violent behaviour. In the report by Human Rights Watch a nine year old rebel described drugs 
as ‘a medicine they give us which makes us to have no respect for anybody; whatever we think to 
do, we just do it.’60 Other young combatants stated that ‘it gives us power and makes us fear 
nobody’, and ‘It makes us feel so tall and you people [civilians] look so small.’61 By experiencing 
these effects in combination with the pervasive influence of the brutal moral codes of rebel society, 
young combatants were pushed towards extreme violence against civilians, and by its very practice, 
desensitised and accustomed to it.  This lead to children becoming perpetrators of some of the worst 
violence of the conflict, a fact played out by the pattern of atrocities in the war and the many 
testimonies of witnesses, victims and the fighters themselves. In the particularly violent invasion of 
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Freetown in January 1999, during which almost 50,000 people were killed or maimed, child 
soldiers played a central role.62 A victim of that attack described the chaos of indiscriminate 
violence as young fighters entered the Rogbalan Mosque and began shooting, cutting, and dousing 
people with petrol:  
 
The mosque was very crowded. It was very confusing and people were running and trying to 
escape but the ten-year-old was standing by one of the doors and I saw him stab people as they 
tried to run past him. Sometimes the executioner would aim directly at one person and other 
times he'd just fire randomly. Then he walked back to the women's section and opened up on 
the people gathered there. Then he positioned himself in the passage leading out of the mosque 
and started picking people off as they tried to escape. It was here he killed a lot of people. His 
was the only way out, so as people made a run for it, he would shoot them.63  
 
In this particular attack sixty-six bodies were counted, including seven children.  When the 
violence came to an end it did so in response to the blowing of a whistle, something the 
rebels recognised as a signal to move on. This emphasises the manner in which the brutal and 
cruel violence of the young combatants, here involving a ten year old, was in itself highly 
indiscriminate but at the same time part of the overall strategy of commanders on the ground.  
 
Many such acts of violence by young combatants exhibited neither sensitivity to shame nor 
political grievances as motives, but were carried out in a disturbingly routine, dispassionate 
manner without hesitation.  Where a semblance of emotion was displayed, enjoyment or 
humour was not uncommon, with combatants even seeking out unique ways to exact violence 
so as to win status among fellow combatants.64 One testimony relates how RUF soldiers 
tricked civilians into believing they were Nigerian peacekeepers. When they revealed their 
true identities they ‘started to laugh’, before forcing the group of thirty men, women and 
children to the ground and shooting each individual in the head and chest.65 Such violence 
demonstrates the brutalised nature of these combatants, who rather than committing atrocities 
through fear of shame, economic motive or grievance, found amusement in cruelty which to 
those outside the rebel world was morally repugnant.  Whilst such behaviour served the 
purposes of instilling fear in the wider population, constituting a military strategy of terror, 
the tormenting and torturing victims often continued when this objective already seemed 
achieved. This underlines that although manipulated or instructed by commanders, violence 
was ultimately shaped by the agency of the individual combatants themselves, who in many 
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harrowing accounts of the conflict, are described as committing atrocities in particularly cruel 
and terrifying ways which are unnecessary from a strategic perspective. 
 
The behaviour of child soldiers during the Sierra Leonean war moved some observers to define the 
conflict in terms of anarchy and unrestrained primordial violence. This conclusion was not solely 
confined to the reductive analysis of New Barbarism, but was reached by many of those victim to 
atrocities who struggled to understand the motives of young perpetrators and felt that 
rationalisations of such violence distorted its true nature.  Accordingly, one witness to the brutal 
massacre of a family by a young boy stated: ‘They are wicked, those boy soldiers. They spare no 
human life.’66 Another Sierra Leonean who came into contact with a young combatant exclaimed: 
‘He's still somebody's child. Maybe he was abducted. God knows what they've done to him.’ 67 
Both these statements encapsulate what has been at the heart of the problem with much of the 
analysis of violence and atrocity in Sierra Leone. The first comment, which recognises the ‘wicked’ 
behaviour of the combatants, has been the basis for flawed analyses which focussed solely on the 
violent and irrationally destructive nature of drug-fuelled fighters, failing to see the wider processes 
which informed violence and the historical context of the conflict.  The second statement highlights 
an attempt to avoid dehumanising combatants in this way, placing actions and behaviour in the 
context of structural processes which have shaped them and from which a variety of parties have 
sought to benefit. However, this attempt to counteract the reduction of the conflict to total anarchy 
has in much analysis resulted in the overemphasis of rational and logical motives, to the extent that 
the truly barbaric and mindless nature of violence described as ‘wicked’ has been misrepresented 
as, in some sense, quite reasonable.  It is possible, and indeed necessary, to recognise both these 
statements as valid representations of the conflict without demeaning either the combatants or the 
suffering of their victims. In a real sense the behaviour of young soldiers can be described as 
wicked and irrational, yet it is clear that this very behaviour was actively engineered and reinforced 
by the designs of RUF leaders who constitute the proverbial rational actor.  There was nothing 
inherent about the violence of young combatants; rather, it was established through the imposition 
of artificial and brutalising conditions which deeply impacted upon abductees and those enveloped 
by the rebel world over a period of many years.  This tension in the literature between seeking to 
accurately portray the very brutal forms of violence and at the same time recognise the wider 
conditions which framed individual actors' behaviour is criticised by Abdullah and Rashid as often 
resulting in a ‘binary either/or situation’ in which children are either seen as conscious agents 
‘fighting with their eyes wide open’ or alternatively as ‘victims of wars they had no hand in 
originating.’68 This binary approach represents as much a false dichotomy as that of ‘greed versus 
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grievance’, since in truth children were both conscious agents often acting to perpetuate the conflict 
through brutalising atrocities as well as victims of the manipulation of leaders and older 
combatants.69  Whilst it was the over-arching structures of the rebel conflict dynamic which 
established young combatants as particularly brutal and morally dislocated killers, it was the 
subsequent atrocities of these combatants which as Maclure and Denov note, ‘fomented and 
perpetuated these structures.’70    
  
 
Conclusion 
 
Approaches to understanding extreme violence in the Sierra Leonean conflict have frequently 
overemphasised the role of grievances and their associated anger and frustration, which in some 
analyses has been used to explain the perpetration of atrocities. Whilst in many instances of 
violence this rational explanation may be accurate, there are yet many other instances of atrocity 
where neither grievance, economic self-interest or military strategy are served. In these cases far 
more significant has been the brutalising process of the conflict which led young combatants to 
exercise extreme violence without compunction as a routine of their conflict behaviour. Through the 
mass abductions of young and impressionable children, RUF leaders exposed youngsters to a 
desensitising environment in which violence and atrocities were not only trivialized but were 
actively rewarded.  Further facilitated by the dispensation of drugs and the forced committing of 
atrocities, these young combatants represented to their leaders a particularly useful kind of violent 
chaos, which they used to both terrorise and punish civilians under a wide range of military and 
economic interests.  Nevertheless, despite the role of leaders in this process and their utilisation of 
atrocities for strategic ends, the particularly brutal forms of violence exacted by child soldiers were 
shaped by their own agency and were by nature often beyond the control of a fragmented and 
inconsistent RUF leadership. The impression of those witness or victim to such violence that it was 
in some sense 'wicked' or 'mindless' accurately describes the manner in which, far from betraying a 
rational consideration of conflict aims or a particular grievance, young combatants acted according 
to their brutal education in violence which even led them to enjoy the cruelty of their atrocities. The 
recognition that extreme violence in Sierra Leone represented a harnessed form of chaos is 
important in highlighting how seemingly irrational violence of young combatants interacted with 
the rational aims of cynical leaders.  This explanation seeks to rectify both the propensity of the 
New Barbarism thesis to ignore the role of rational actors, and the failure of many Rational Actor 
approaches to account for irrational violence. Furthermore, by understanding how the logic of 
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violence extends beyond grievances, a fear of shame or some economic greed, the need for 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration programmes to address the problem of brutalised 
child soldiers and their entrenched moral order is made clear.  The difficulty of integrating 
combatants brought up within the conflict environment into civil society, and their proclivity to 
commit atrocities as part of their routine conflict behaviour, is evidenced by the emerging regional 
dynamic of migrating child combatants.71  Although economic incentives, as ever, have played their 
part in bringing West African fighters to these conflicts, the presence of the same brutalised child 
combatants who inhabited the enclosed world of the RUF has been accompanied by exactly the 
same array of atrocities.  Until this issue is effectively addressed, the potential for renewed violence 
will continue to threaten Sierra Leone's long-term stability.    
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